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Foreign direct investment (FDI) is rightly
considered as an engine in transforming Cen-
tral and East European Countries (CEECs).
Without massive inflows of capital, technol-
ogy and management know-how a sustainable
growth is unlikely to happen.
Although governments in CEECs make more
than air effort to create a favourable climate
for FDI, the international investors' commu-
nity has responded hesitatingly. Only the
number of projects have skyrocketed, the
amount of capital invested has increased only
at a slow pace. Foreign investors are "testing
the water", but they are not rushing to jump.
The paper attempts to provide an overview of
the current state and prospects of FDI in
CEECs. First, it briefly reviews the theoretical
framework for understanding FDI. Then it fo-
cuses on the trends and patterns of FDI-flows.




Foreign direct investment (FDI) is rightly considered as an engine in transforming Central
East European Countries (CEECs) into western-style market economies. It is hoped to per-
form a catalytic role in restructuring and privatizing the state industry and in integrating the
CEECs into the world economy. Without massive inflows of capital, technology and man-
agement know-how over many years to come a sustainable economic growth is unlikely to
happen.
Although FDI is still a hotly debated issue in CEECs - the opposition stems not only from or-
thodox communists who reject foreign capital penetration for ideological reasons but also
from ordinary people who are afraid that strangers could steel the national property - govern-
ments make more than an effort to create a favourable climate for foreign investment (Dobo-
siewicz, 1992). By and large the basic legal and institutional framework for FDI has already
been established (OECD, 1993; Alter, Wehrle, 1993): in all CEECs joint ventures and fully
foreign owned companies are allowed; in some countries and in cases of large-scale invest-
ment, however, authorization by the government is still required, and in some sensitive sec-
tors foreign participation is restricted. Is goes without saying that CEECs are still far away
from being an attractive harbour for international capital. There are still too many uncertain-
ties surrounding the process of transformation which must be considered as an important im-
pediment for attracting foreign capital (Donges, Wieners, 1993).
Actually, the international investors' community has responded hesitatingly. FDI in CEECs
has expanded rapidly only with respect to the number of projects. At the end of 1992
70 000 projects were registered in fourteen CEECs - compared with only 2 500 at the end of
1989. Though the volume of capital invested (in value terms) was less impressive. In 1993
inflows into CEECs were estimated for nearly 4 billion dollars, and the stock did not exceed
the total of 15 billion dollars at the end of the year. No doubt, foreign investors are still jeal-
ously "tasting the water", but they are not rushing to jump. In particular, they are reluctant to
realize large-scale investments. This is no reason for surprise. Competition for international
capital is keen and shifts in the flows of FDI can occur only gradually.
The paper attempts to provide an overview of the current state and prospects of FDI in
CEECs. First, it briefly reviews the theoretical framework for understanding FDI. Then it fo-
1 An earlier draft of the paper was presented at the conference "Transforming Economies and Euro-
pean Integration" held in Sofia from 27-28 May, 1994. Thanks is due to my colleague Birgit
Sander and to participants of the conference for valuable comments on an earlier draft.-2-
cuses on the trends and patterns of FDI-flows since 1989. Finally, it draws attention to the
policy towards FDI.
The paper is more a descriptive than an analytical one. For the time being it is too early for a
comprehensive analysis: the data base is poor and the period of time under consideration is
short. Both trends and patterns are still influenced by accident, e.g. by single large-scale pro-
jects of some few multinationals. Nevertheless the paper may serve as a basis for discussing
the large variety of issues related to FDI.
II Theoretical Considerations
1 Economic Theory of FDI
Economists and policy makers in CEECs often expect very much in respect to FDI. Investors
are not in a hurry to invest their money there. They have several options how to enter a for-
eign market: they can do it in the conventional way by producing at home and then going for
trade in goods and services or they can build up a foreign production base either by a green-
field investment, by a joint venture or by acquiring an existing company. And they can opt
for an intermediate mode of market entry: they can conclude a contractual arrangement with a
foreign producer in form of licensing or offshore processing (Schmidt, Naujoks, 1993).
Although there is an enormous literature on FDI, a generally accepted theory is still lacking.
2
Even the most popular approach, the "eclectic theory of international production" developed
by Dunning (1980) and others, is far from a generalization (Parry, 1985; Rugman, 1985).
Notwithstanding the reservations it postulates the conditions under which FDI is undertaken
at all (Sander, Schmidt, 1993).
According to the "eclectic approach" three conditions are necessary for FDI (OLI-paradigm):
A company must have ownership advantages in operating in foreign markets that allow it
to successfully compete with other, in particular with domestic companies;
it must perceive some locational attraction of a foreign as compared to its domestic pro-
duction base in manufacturing all or parts of its products;
it must believe that these advantages can be best exploited internally rather than by
means of non-equity arrangements, e.g., licensing agreements or management contracts.
For a short review see Agarwal, Gubitz, Nunnenkamp (1991) and Stehn (1992).-3-
Ownership adviantages are to be conceived as specific competitive advantages a company has
vis-a-vis its foreign competitors. They originate from intangible assets such as superior know-
ledge in terms of production technologies, management know-how or marketing skills as well
as from brand names or access to cheap funds. If ownership advantages are large enough to
overcompensate for the additional cost of operating in a foreign market, then the company
may feel invited to become internationally active - either by trade, by licensing or by FDI.
Locational advantages may originate firstly from different relative factor endowments on
which traditional trade theories are based. The traditional approaches to international trade
are: the H-O-S model, the product cycle model and the models explaining intra-industry
trade. In the H-O-S model, e.g., the choice between domestic or foreign production is deter-
mined by the geographical distribution of immobile factors, such as cheap labour, plenty
natural resources or favourable climate. Secondly, locational advantages may originate from
a country's economic system and legal framework which predetermines the degree of po-
litical and economic stability as well as the structure of incentives and constraints which
economic agents are facing,
a country's trade regime (its "openness") which is an important determinant of sales per-
spectives,
a country's quality of infrastructure or agglomerational advantages which are important
determinants of production costs.
Internalization advantages mainly originate from economizing transaction costs, especially
with respect to the cost of internationally transferring and using intangible assets such as tech-
nological knowledge. It is well known that international licensing is often insufficient such
that the costs of enforcing property rights to intangible goods are prohibitively high. Mostly
this is the case for non-standardized production technologies, for advanced technological
knowledge, management know-how and other skills to which property rights are not codified
but incorporated in an enterprise's employees. Intangible assets to which property rights can-
not be enforced are public goods. Private costs are diverging from social costs such that the
market mechanism fails to set prices efficiently. This market failure translates into high trans-
action costs. Companies which are operating internationally can avoid to incur them by es-
tablishing or acquiring subsidiaries abroad such as to use and to transfer intangible assets on
markets which are internal to their organisation.
Initially it has been stated that the existence of each ownership, locational and internationali-
zation advantages is a necessary and the simultaneous existence of them is a sufficient condi-
tion for FDI to occur (OLI-paradigm). More recently it has been argued that locational advan--4-
tages of a potential host country could be a both necessary and sufficient condition for FDI
(Stehn, 1992). FDI may be undertaken even without firm specific advantages on part of the
foreign investor if the potential host country's locational advantages are large enough to
(over)compensate for only small or even lacking firm-specific advantages. This argument has
important implications for economic policy towards FDI as within the OLI-paradigm loca-
tional attractiveness is the variable which is most perceptible to economic policy.
2 Motives for FDI
The difficulties in providing a general theory of FDI also stem from the observation that the
motives are differing considerably, between the different markets in which foreign investors
are engaged (Agarwal, Gubitz, Nunnenkamp, 1991). The traditional literature has focused on
market access as the main motive for FDI. It states that there is an optimal timing for starting
FDI: a company should have reached a certain market share in a foreign market by means of
exporting before becoming an investor there. Actually, most multinationals start with.exports
and follow with FDI - as far as they will gain from specific ownership, locational and inter-
nalization advantages. Incidentally, the argument of market access is only convincing if for-
eign markets are closed; otherwise it may still be more profitable to serve them by exports.
Insofar, the motives for FDI are more expected to be on the supply side than on the demand
side: in the primary commodity sector investors are mainly interested in finding access to the
deposit of raw materials while in the manufacturing sector they mainly look for cheap labour
or qualified staff.
The relative importance of labour costs for FDI decisions, however, is not as straightforward
as it might appear (Agarwal, 1989). Low labour costs are a necessary, though not a sufficient
condition. One factor which is reducing the importance of cheap labour as a locational advan-
tage is the increasing degree of automization in most manufacturing industries. Actually, FDI
is more important in industries producing sophisticated products (such as automotive, electri-
cal, machinery and transport equipment) than in industries producing standardized products.
In the textile and the clothing industry, e.g., foreign investors prefer sub-contracting rather
than FDI as these industries are not characterized by firm-specific advantages which might
induce equity arrangements.
3 Forms of FDI
"Traditional" forms of FDI can be described as a package with which foreign investors pro-
vide capital, technology and management at the same time. Normally, investors prefer to es-
tablish joint ventures in which they are the majority shareholder. The joint venture approach
provides some advantages for them: above all, they can benefit from their partner's country--5-
specific knowledge yet still having full say in running the company. This also conveniently
meets the host government's desire to find foreign partners for restructuring ailing state-
owned companies.
However, frequently the existing companies in CEECs are in a deplorable state - suffering
badly from technological backwardness and overmanning. Restructuring them is risky and ex-
pensive. Therefore foreign investors may refrain from the traditional forms of FDI. Indeed, in
recent years new forms of FDI have gained importance round the world (Hill, 1985).
First, there is a greater "un-packing" of FDI, that is foreign firms separately "sell" either
technologies (mainly by licensing) or capital (by buying shares).
Second, there is an increasing number of joint ventures in which the foreign partner is the
minority shareholder.
Both forms have become common in developed market economies as well as in some (Asian)
developing economies; and they are also emerging in CEECs; An outstanding example is the
Skoda-Volkswagen deal, where at present VW holds only a minority share of 31 p.c. (with an
option though to acquire the majority) - although actually VW is running Skoda as its own
company.
As the theory suggests that investors may have different objectives when investing
abroad - short or long-run profit maximisation, risk diversification and widening of the prod-
uct cycle - we may find different forms of FDI for realizing them. It is controversially de-
bated whether there are country-specific "styles" of FDI. There are no definite answers
(Caves, 1993): we find a great variety of FDI-strategies applied by investors from the main
source countries such as the USA, Japan or Germany, and the main host regions such as
North and Latin America or Europe. But it seems that, e.g., German investors have a longer
time horizon than investors from the United States and therefore show a stronger engagement
also in politically and economically unstable countries. To some extent this kind of behaviour
may explain why German companies are the leaders in FDI in most of the CEECs.
4 Transformation and FDI
Embarking on the process of economic transformation exposes the CEECs to a major shock.
Due to this shock it becomes necessary to straighten out the distortions resulting from former
politically determined specialization. The CEECs' new position in the world economy will
depend upon-6-
the specific quality of their resources, namely locational characteristics, natural resour-
ces, labour force and capital stock as well as upon
the specific design of the institutional framework, namely the kind of economic policy
they pursue (Sander, Schmidt, 1993).
Transformation by its very nature is a dynamic process. The beginning of this process is
usually characterized by a large depreciation of the stock of fixed capital while labour force
and natural resources do not have to undergo depreciation to the same extent. This makes the
transforming economy relatively richly endowed with labour and natural resources while
relatively poorly endowed with capital. With< respect to resource endowment and consequent-
ly with respect to comparative advantages this economy now easily resembles the economy of
a less developed country. By CEECs this is often perceived as a "downgrading" and as a loss
of economic prestige.
However, the underlying assumption of the "eclectic approach" is that each type of interna-
tional economic activity goes along with a specific level or stage of economic development
(Dunning, 1991). Accordingly, a transformation economy which is actually experiencing a
major drawback with respect to development sees itself invaded by foreign investments which
rather seem to fit a less developed country than its own until recently relatively high indus-
trialized economy. This "downgrading" though is not caused by FDI and the specific form in
which it occurs. Rather, causality runs reversely: the types and forms of FDI which presently
occur are indicating the very stage of development to which the transformation crisis has
thrown the economy back. There should be no question which type of FDI the Central East
European countries need first: what they need is a rough Jeep, not a luxurious sports car. This
can come later.
5 Hypothesis on FDI
From the theoretical considerations we can derive some hypothesis: we should expect a high
concentration of FDI in those host countries which
are leading in the transformation process, in particular in establishing a sound institu-
tional framework of FDI, especially in privatizing state-owned enterprises and
are able to offer a promising economic environment, in particular growing markets, qua-
lified labour and low production costs.
We can also expect that FDI will concentrate on certain sectors - according to the host coun-
try's level of development, pattern of specialization and factor endowment (Dunning, 1991).-7-
It is likely that FDI is more important in sophisticated industries than in industries producing
standardized goods as these industries hardly allow ownership and internalization advantages
to be realized.
III Scope and Limitation of the Data Base
An obstacle for analyzing FDI is the poor data base. Only few CEECs made available data
which relate to FDI and even these statistics report oft different subjects. Therefore, data col-
lected by international organizations are incomplete and inconsistent so that it is hard to ana-
lyse them.
The main inconsistencies stem from different methods of registration and from different times
when the inflow of cash is reported. Further problems arise as it is hard to distinguish be-
tween direct investment and portfolio investment (OECD, 1993).
In principle, an FDI data base should include
new equity investments as well as long-term credits,
reinvested earnings respectively consolidated losses and
changes in the net value asset.
It should involve only investments stemming from establishing, acquiring or expanding an
affiliated subsidiary corporation or branch, but not portfolio investments (Brewer, 1991). In
reality though, available data relating to net flows are based on the capital account of the bal-
ance of payment statistics. By definition these data exclude invested profits and consolidated
losses as well as revaluation of the capital stock.
For the most part this paper uses data relating to cumulated flows (in value terms) which are
collected and published by the OECD, the IMF, the UNIDO and the ECE, supplemented by
data from national statistics. Despite all shortcomings explained above, these data allow to
identify the basic trends and patterns both for the group of CEECs as a whole as well as for
single countries.
IV Assessment of the Current Situation
1 Conditions of FDI
The key to FDI is a legal and institutional framework to set the scene for productive invest-
ment in general. After the collapse of the old system all CEECs suffered from such problems-8-
as oversized and overstaffed companies, unclear property rights, seriously distorted prices, ir-
rational tax and tariff systems, weak financial institutions and exaggerated bureaucratic regu-
lations. Meanwhile all CEEGs have made major steps towards a market oriented sys-
tem - though some have moved quicker while some have moved slower. A report prepared by
the OECD (1993) identified three groups of countries with respect to provisions regulating
FDI:
The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as well as Hungary have already estab-
lished a comprehensive, sophisticated legal system. It is not without faults and gaps but
offers foreigners reasonable incentives for business.
Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic states, Russia and, with some reservation, also Poland have
created a patchwork of laws which is mixed: some parts are modern while other parts
look quite old-fashioned.
Albania and the other successor states of the Soviet Union have laid down only the basic
legal rules for FDI.
All countries have started comprehensive privatization programmes. Concepts and legislation,
however, vary widely and public and political support similarly do. The same is true with re-
spect to the current state of the privatization process. It is therefore not easy to examine its
impact on FDI. The OECD (1993) again distinguishes three main groups of countries:
Hungary is considered as the leader although the game is still running. Its privatization
policy is more "open" to foreigners than those of other countries. This may explain why
Hungary has been very successful in attracting foreign capital.
Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia and the Ukraine are placed in the midfield. They put
more emphasize on distributing vouchers to their people and less on pulling in investors
from abroad.
Albania, Bulgaria and Belorussia are at the bottom of the Scoreboard. Their road to pri-
vatization is cobbled with uncertainties which may discourage foreigners.
This ranking may be worse in some cases.
3 It can be argued that in respect to privatization
there is no point in placing Russia and the Ukraine in the midfield - together with Poland and
the Czech Republic. However, each sort of ranking is more or less arbitrary. In this case the
3 For an update see OECD (1994).-9-
criterion is the technique of privatization: there is no doubt that the method of voucher pri-
vatization poses some impediments to FDI.
It should be noted that all CEECs restrict FDI to one or more "strategic" sectors such as de-
fence, aviation, shipping, energy or banking.
Despite the manifold legal and institutional obstacles all CEECs use a wide variety of instru-
ments in setting incentives in order to influence an investment decision by increasing the
profit accruing to the potential investment or by reducing the risks attached to it. The most
important are fiscal instruments (such as preferential tax rates, tax exemption and tax credits),
but also non-financial instruments (such as import protection or the establishment of free-
trade enterprise zones).
In the literature it is controversially discussed how the pattern of international direct invest-
ment will be affected by government actions. An OECD report on "investment incentives and
disincentives" (1991) came to ambiguous conclusions. However, an unfavourable economic
and political climate cannot easily be surmounted by special incentive government actions.
Table 1 - Obstacles for FDI in Central East Europe (given by a sample of 163 respondents
from developed market economies)
Lack of information about potential partners
Difficulties in assessing the potential of local enterprises
Complicated legal structure'
Lack of transparency of the economy
Insufficient stability of the political and/or economic situation











Apart from enhancing the attractiveness of CEECs to foreign investors by implementing a
sound legal and institutional framework, there is much more to do in order to improve the
knowledge of foreigners about which opportunities CEECs may offer them. An inquiry
among a sample of 163 entrepreneurs, business consultants and bankers of western countries
who were regarded as potential investors in Central East European countries indicates that
their reluctance is mainly caused by a lack of transparency within the local economy rather
than by bureaucratic administrative procedures (Table 1).-10-
2 Performance of FDI
a) Overall Trends
Although some FDI trickled into the CMEA countries already in the seventies and eighties a
dynamic development only started after 1989 when new, democratic governments committed
"themselves to economic transformation. From the end of 1989 to the end of 1992 the number
of foreign projects skyrocketed - according to a data base of the ECE (1993) - from about
2 500 to about 70 000 (Table 2). Thus it is fairly reasonable to assume that at present more
than 100 000 foreign investment projects are registered in CEECs.
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1991 | 1992 1989
900 1200
4 000 6 000 257
3 120
2 875
9 100 13 000
4 800 10100 -7
8 000 20 700
26 800 51000
1 000 1 650
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(a) Registered at the end of year. - (b) January-September. - (c) January-November. - (d) January-October.
Source: Economic Commission for Europe (1993,1994).
Although the large number of registered projects overstates the FDI performance:
Only an estimated average of only 50 percent of all projects are virtually in operation
(OECD, 1993). A large proportion of companies are just an accommodation address.
4 An analysis of the recent trends in some countries provide Hamar (1993), Sereghyova
1 (1994),
Sadowska-Cieslak (1994b), Gradev, Bobeva (1994) and OECD (1994).-11-
Only a minority of companies have made substantial investments. The average size of
foreign equity involvement is minimal. The typical FDI in CEECs is rather small.
The mushrooming of projects formally registered must be attributed to foreign activities in
trade and other services. In these sectors foreigners mostly invested just the minimum deposit
demanded by law. Large-scale investments have usually been made only in the raw material
and the manufacturing sector and they are small in number.
'Consequently, flows of capital have increased at a much slower pace than the number of pro-
jects registered. In 1992 flows to CEECs amounted to just 3.8 billion $ or a little bit more
(Table 2).
5 For comparison: at the same time global FDI financed by OECD countries reach-
ed about 175 billion $; flows to CEECs amounted to less than 2 percent of the total.









































































Source: OECD (1993,1994); several national sources.
Stock figures (derived from cumulated flows) indicate that at the end of 1992 not more than
15 billion $ were invested in CEECs (Table 3). In respect to total world-wide FDI stocks - ap-
proximately 1.5 trillion $ - a quantite negligeable (Jungnickel, 1993). From this one could
imagine what an enormous potential for FDI in CEECs still exists.
The preliminary figure for 1993 recently published by the ECE is 3.9 billion $.-12-
b) Patterns
aa) Geographical Distribution
With respect to host country preferences there is a clear-cut ranking: foreign investors favour
the Central East European countries and among them Hungary, Poland and the Czech Repub-
lic. Hungary, has.been able to attract the lion's share (30 percent) of foreign capital but Poland
and the Czech Republic are making up mightily. According to recent national statistics the
amount of FDI stocks in Poland jumped from 1.4 billion $ at the end of 1992 to 3 billion $ at
the end of 1993 and in the Czech Republic from 1.7 billion $ to 2.2 billion $. In these three
countries accumulated FDI flows accounted for.about half of FDI attracted by all CEECs.
It is remarkable enough that the successor states of the Soviet Union are more and more be-
coming an attractive place for western FDI, too. Especially the Ukraine and the Baltic states
could raise their share in total FDI projects significantly. At the end of 1992 in Estonia, Lat-
via and Lithuania together nearly 6 000 joint ventures were registered, much more than ex-
isted at the same time in Russia (3 500).
Flows of FDI to CEECs stem mainly from western developed market economies. The geo-
graphical pattern differs widely, but on the average there is a clear predominance of Ger-
many: in 1991 and 1992 more than two fifths of reported FDI came from there (Table 4). The
other most important source countries were Austria, the United States and the Netherlands.









































: Germany is-ranking among the top five in all CEECs, but it is not the champion everywhere.
On the contrary, in Bulgaria we find Greece at the top, in Slovakia Austria, in Hungary and
Russia the USA, in Romania France, in Estonia Finland and in the Ukraine Italy (Table 5).
That means: fears about "German domination" in CEECs are basically exaggerated. RecentBibliothek
-13-
statistics indicate that even in the Czech and in the Slovak Republic the predomination of its
two western neighbour nations - Germany and Austria - is apparently becoming a matter of
the past (SereghyovS, 1994).
Table 5 - Five Top Source Countries in Selected Central East and East European Host













(a) 31 March, 1993.
(e) 1 July, 1992. - (f)














































1992. - (d) 1 August, 1993.-
1 January, 1992. - (g) 1 January, 1993. - (h) 31 March, 1993. - (i) CIS.
Source: OECD (1993).
^ • • •
There is no simple explanation for the different clusters: geographic proximity as well as
traditional economic and cultural links are perhaps the major cause of that. The high share of
French investment in Romania or of Finland in Estonia, e.g., may be explained by language
ties. Sometimes, though, the ranking is strongly influenced by accident such as large-scale
engagements of single investors.
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The bulk of FDI in CEECs has come from western European countries. The only important
overseas investors are those from the USA which hold not only the top in Russia and Hun-
gary but are among the leaders in all other CEECs, too. Japan, one of the leading investing
countries in the world, has been conspicuously reluctant to enter the CEECs. This is in line
with the typical wait-and-see attitude of Japanese investors observed in other parts of the
world.
Especially flows can be "biased" by such transactions. For instance, in the Czech Republic the
share of US-American capital in overall FDI undertaken in 1993 jumped to 45 percent while the
share of German capital decreased to 14 percent. This was due to a large-scale investment of Philip
Morris (about 190 million $) into a joint venture with the Czech company Tabak Kutna Hora
(SereghyovS, 1994).-14-
Noticeable is the high regional concentration of investments within the single countries. Most
of the foreign investors go either to the capital city or to regions of industrial agglomeration.
In Russia, e.g., the bulk of FDI is concentrated on Moscow City and the Central Region, in
Hungary on Budapest City and the western parts of the country. This does not come as a sur-
prise: it is the best way to take advantage of externalities which are strategically important for
foreign investors.
bb) Sectoral Concentration
A general trend in world-wide FDI is that "it started everywhere in services" (Inotai, 1992).
The CEECs are no exception to this. The bulk of projects is in commerce, transport, banking,
insurance and other consumer and business services. However, in this respect we have to
make a distinction between the number of the projects and the amount of investment made
inside and outside the service sector. In value terms the sectors of energy, mining and manu-
facturing attract most of the capital. This is due to the fact that in those sectors the capital re-
quired is much higher than in the services.
Table 6 - Structure of Foreign Direct Investment of German Companies in Central and East
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funds(c)




































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1994).
Due to the insufficient data base it is difficult to draw conclusions of the industrial composi-
tion of FDI in CEECs which could be generalized. From German FDI statistics (which appear
to be fairly reliable) we can conclude that on average manufacturing is the major recipient of
foreign capital: at the end of 1992 about 60 percent of stocks of German FDI in CEECs were
allocated to this sector (Table 6).-15-
Although it could be expected that labour- and capital-intensive industries such as production
of consumer goods and food processing offer the best opportunities, these industries generally
seem to provide only limited scope for FDI: 45 percent of total investment in manufacturing
were concentrated on just four branches, namely chemical industry, engineering, vehicle
building and electrical equipment. There are at least two explanations for this (Schmidt,
1993).
First: in labour- and capital-intensive industries technologies are mostly relatively simple,
hence the possibilities that foreign firms may gain firm-specific advantages are quite
limited. In those industries subcontracting is the dominant form of foreign investment.
Second: the main interest of foreign investors is not to take advantage of sweat-shop la-
bour. Most of them look for a long-term engagement. This may explain why the structure
of German FDI in CEECs differs significantly from the structure which is typical for de-
veloping countries. It is rather similar to that of Spain and Portugal, two of the preferred
western European target countries for German FDI.
Presently, the main strategy of German companies is to build-up "prolonged workbenches" in
human labour-intensive industries. They hire firms, e.g. producing industrial switches, com-
puter keyboards or headlights and brakes for cars, which can be employed as suppliers for
their home production base. The relatively short distance between domestic plants and foreign
subsidiaries makes it easy to meet even tight delivery schedules. This gives producers in most
CEECs an edge on their Asian rivals.
cc) Commodity Specialization and Trade Orientation
First the structural pattern of FDI was more or less of accidental nature. Recently, a relatively
big share of fresh investment has been channelled into the manufacturing sector (and into
manufacturing subdelivery bases). This indicates that a reorientation of foreign investors is
under way: the structure of FDI comes closer to the comparative advantages of the countries
than it was in the past. Consequently, we have to expect.different patterns in different coun-
tries according to their respective comparative advantages and levels of development (Dun-
ning, 1991; SereghyovS, 1994).
A lot of research has investigated the contribution of FDI to industrial restructuring and es-
pecially to establishing an export base. By and large, FDI seems to be more export oriented
than oriented towards local markets, but due to lack of data this point remains controversial in
the literature. Presumably, it is correct to say that multinationals generally start FDI as export
bridgeheads for securing their own domestic markets or for serving international markets; but
later they turn to supplying the host countries' markets when local demand has increased as a-16-
result of industrialization and growing income and the host countries' markets offer new sales
opportunities. In this respect foreign investors have often been criticized that their exports of
resource-based and labour-intensive products have a much larger share in total trade than
their exports of "sophisticated goods". However, the obvious importance of inter-industry ex-
ports at the early stage of industrialization does not come as a surprise: the pattern is fully in
line with the theory of economic development. Mostly, this will change when the host coun-
tries have approached the state of intra-industry production.
Intra-firm trade plays an increasingly important role in foreign trade orientation of FDI. This
has a strong impact also on imports of host countries. Intra-firm imports consist mainly of
capital goods to establish foreign affiliates and of "sophisticated" intermediate products used
for local processing which is often considered as a factor which weakens the progress of in-
dustrialization in the host country. However, this pattern of intra-firm imports rather reflects
the local availability of inputs at the respective stage of industrialization. It will change quick-
ly in the ongoing process of industrialization.
3 Effects of FDI
It is often criticised by CEECs that the contribution of FDI to build up the host country's new
capital stock is relatively small. Indeed, at first sight the FDI performance remains disap-
pointing if measured against the expectations and needs of the CEECs. The amount of in-
vested capital was still low at the end of 1992: on the average about 1.5 percent of GDP
(Table 7). Only in two countries, in Hungary and - by a wide margin - in the Czech Republic,
stocks of FDI already accumulated to a significantly higher share.
Whatever is the reason for the poor capital inflows, such magnitude that they could close the
"capital gap" should not be expected (Stern, 1994). Historical experience of LDCs in the sev-
enties and eighties shows that annually net flows of FDI averaged only 0.4 percent over a
twenty year period. In addition, only few countries' inflows were persistently clear above (e.g.
Malaysia), most of the others were clearly below the average (e.g. India); some countries'
shares exhibited stability while others experienced significant changes from one year to an-
other (Brewer, 1991).
Even if there were major increases in FDI flows in the next two or three years - which is un-
likely - it would take several years before the cumulative effect could be substantial. Insofar
the CEECs cannot rely on growing FDI-flows alone, the bulk of capital must be mobilized at
home.-17-
Table 7 - Stocks of Foreign Direct Investment in Percent of Gross Domestic Product in

































Economists and policy makers in CEECs always complain that foreign companies are too re-
luctant with respect to large-scale investments. They are right. The number of projecjs started
is actually impressive but the amount of invested capital is still relatively low. The question
arises: do we need to rewrite the textbooks on FDI? The answer is no. FDI in CEECs appears
to be fully consistent with conventional wisdom. Therefore, nobody should be disappointed.
From economic theory we learn that FDI is only one out of several possible forms of interna-
tional involvement. A company in search of such an involvement faces a trade-off in the
method of entering a foreign market: it will opt for an equity arrangement only under certain
conditions - if it can identify significant ownership, locational and internalization advantages.
Otherwise it would choose a strategy like exporting or contracting. Apparently, the conditions
for western investments in CEECs still leave much to be desired (Donges, Wieners, 1993;
Welfens, 1993; Sadowska-Cieslak, 1994a):
Legislation which guarantees private property (or a prompt and full compensation at
market values in the event of expropriation) and the repatriation of capital seldom come
up to western standards. In this respect further improvements should be made.-18-
Acquisition of real estate and land is handled in a different way in different countries, but
everywhere it is still more or less restricted. FDI would well be encouraged by allowing
foreigners to acquire the real estate necessary to the business.
Registration and licensing procedures are often fathomless and sectors submitted to
authorization or barred to foreigners frequently unclear. Formulas as "prejudicial to the
country's economic interest" should be stated more precisely.
r
Legislation on taxes and duties often lacks transparency. Somewhere foreign investors
are preferred to local investors, somewhere they are discriminated against. Rules, proce-
dures and preferences should be clarified.
Privatization is still a sensitive issue in most countries. In principle, foreign investors are
welcome to participate in the privatization process but, in fact, they may be often dis-
couraged by intransparent and complicated procedures. Governments in CEECs should
recognize that the market for the run-down and overstaffed state-owned enterprises is by
far no seller market. More efforts should be made to privatize these enterprises directly to
foreigners.
Actually, the policy framework of the CEECs in search of FDI appears to be ambivalent. It
consists of various forms of concessions and subsidies on the one hand and a complex system
of controls and regulations on the other hand. This reflects the governments' desire to obtain
the highest possible benefit from FDI in terms of technology, capital and management know-
how, but at the same time to restrict foreign ownership and control of the economy. The con-
cern of host countries to preserve economic sovereignty may be understandable. But the eco-
nomic effect of most regulations and controls imposed on multinationals is detrimental, re-
ducing rather than increasing the benefits from FDI. There is some evidence in the literature
that many governments are obliged to offer concessions and subsidies only to compensate for
the controls and regulations they impose on foreigners.
A considerable number of studies dealing with incentives to FDI have finally concluded that
they are presumably more harmful than useful (Brewer, 1991):
Incentives may be inappropriate with respect to the host country's factor endowment. A
common contention in the literature is the high capital intensity of multinationals in host
countries (especially in LDCs) relative to that of locally owned firms. It is argued that
such capital intensive techniques are disregarding relative scarcities, that is not "appropri-
ate" to the (mostly) labour rich and capital scarce countries, and may adversely affect
employment opportunities.-19-
Incentives may influence the host country's trade performance. A crucial point is the de-
mand of multinationals for protected markets. Granting protection host countries may be
pushed towards a strategy of import substitution (IS) instead of an export promotion
(EP). It is a matter of fact that many LDCs which were successful in attracting FDI fol-
lowed IS. Under IS, however, multinationals will consider the incentives provided by
tariffs and quotas as "artificial" and only limited in time. Indeed, these incentives may
not be a strong inducement for foreign investors to go abroad.
Incentives may also have an impact on the forms of inflow of foreign capital - whether
multinationals choose grass-root investments, joint ventures or mergers. In many CEECs
governments have a preference for joint ventures - although the welfare effects of this
strategy are uncertain.
Several studies based on interviews with managers of multinationals report that they regard
factors such as resource endowments, level of economic development, future growth per-
formance, market size, infrastructure facilities and political stability to be much more impor-
tant in their investment decision process than concessions and subsidies (Sadowska-Cieslak,
1994a). Studies based on regression analysis come to the same result. Obviously, most multi-
nationals regard such incentives to be too volatile, transitory or even illusory. Tax holidays,
e.g., are usually given to firms only during the early days of their operations when they are
least likely to show profits. Therefore, governments in CEECs should primarily pay attention
to creating a general and consistent framework for foreign investors - only then can they hope
to participate adequately in international capital flows. They must learn that FDI cannot be
switched on like an electric light. To get the reputation of an attractive harbour for FDI needs
some time - and some effort, too.-20-
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